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4JOAn B. KrOC InsTITuTE FOr PEACE & JusTICE
the mission of the joan b. kroc 
institute for peace & justice (ipj) 
is to foster peace, cultivate justice 
and create a safer world. through 
education, research and peace-
making activities, the ipj offers 
programs that advance scholarship 
and practice in conflict resolution 
and human rights.
the ipj, a unit of the university of 
San Diego’s joan b. kroc School of 
peace Studies, draws on catholic 
social teaching that sees peace as 
inseparable from justice and acts to 
prevent and resolve conflicts that 
threaten local, national and international peace. the ipj was established in 2000 
through a generous gift from the late joan b. kroc to the university of San Diego 
to create an institute for the study and practice of peace and justice. programming 
began in early 2001 and the building was dedicated in December 2001 with a 
conference, “peacemaking with justice: policy for the 21st century.” 
the institute strives, in joan b. kroc’s words, to “not only talk about peace, 
but to make peace.” in its peacebuilding initiatives, the ipj works with local 
partners to help strengthen their efforts to consolidate peace with justice in 
the communities in which they live. in nepal, for example, the ipj recently 
began its eighth year of work with nepali groups to support inclusiveness 
and dialogue in the transition from armed conflict and monarchy to peace 
and multiparty democracy. in West africa, the ipj works with local human 
rights groups to strengthen their ability to pressure government for much 
needed reform and accountability.
5the Women peaceMakers program documents the stories and best practices 
of international women leaders who are involved in human rights and 
peacemaking efforts in their home countries. WorldLink, a year-round 
educational program for high school students from San Diego and baja 
california, connects youth to global affairs.
community outreach includes speakers, films, art and opportunities for 
discussion between community members, academics and practitioners on issues 
of peace and social justice, as well as dialogue with national and international 
leaders in government, nongovernmental organizations and the military.
in addition to the joan b. kroc institute for peace & justice, the joan b. kroc 
School of peace Studies includes the trans-border institute, which promotes 
border-related scholarship and an active role for the university in the cross-
border community, and a master’s program in peace and justice Studies to 
train future leaders in the field. 
6JOAn B. KrOC DIsTInguIsHED LECTurE sErIEs
endowed in 2003 by a generous gift to the joan b. kroc institute for peace 
& justice from the late joan kroc, the Distinguished Lecture Series is a forum 
for high-level national and international leaders and policymakers to share 
their knowledge and perspectives on issues related to peace and justice. the 
goal of the series is to deepen understanding of how to prevent and resolve 
conflict and promote peace with justice.
the Distinguished Lecture Series offers the community at large an opportunity 
to engage with leaders who are working to forge new dialogues with parties 
in conflict and who seek to answer the question of how to create an enduring 
peace for tomorrow. the series, which is held at the joan b. kroc institute 
for peace & justice at the university of San Diego’s joan b. kroc School of 
peace Studies, examines new developments in the search for effective tools 
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BIOgrAPHY OF THE HOnOrABLE  
LOuIsE ArBOur
the Honorable Louise arbour was the united nations High commissioner 
for Human rights from 2004 until june 2008. as high commissioner, arbour 
earned an international reputation for courage and tenacity and gained the 
respect of governments, human rights groups and human rights victims 
around the world.
arbour began a distinguished academic career in 1974, culminating in the 
position of associate dean at the osgoode Hall Law School of York university 
in toronto, canada, in 1987. the same year, she was appointed to the 
Supreme court of ontario (High court of justice) and later served on the 
court of appeal for ontario. in 1996, she was appointed by the u.n. Security 
council as chief prosecutor for the international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and for rwanda. after three years as prosecutor, she was 
appointed to the Supreme court of canada in 1999.
arbour has received many awards and medals, including the Medal of Honour 
from the international association of prosecutors, the Franklin Delano 
roosevelt Four Freedoms Medal (Freedom from Fear) from the roosevelt 
Study center in the netherlands, the Lord reading Law Society’s Human 
rights award, the eiD-uL-aDHa award from the association of progressive 
Muslims of ontario, the national achievement award from jewish Women 
international of canada, and the order of canada. She has served on the 
board of the international crisis Group since 2000. throughout her career 
arbour has sought to liberate both the oppressed and their oppressors by 




The following is an edited transcript of an interview with Louise Arbour, 
conducted on Sept. 24, 2008, by Dustin Sharp, J.D., senior program officer  
at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice.
 
DS: I’d like to interview about a broad range of topics, touching both 
upon your personal life and background as well as many things related 
to international justice and human rights. To start with, is there 
anything in your early experience growing up in Canada that you feel, 
looking back, set you on the path to becoming an advocate for justice 
and human rights or to becoming a member of the legal profession? 
Were there any special figures or experiences that influenced you? 
La: essentially no, which i hope is encouraging for the numerous young people 
i meet who don’t seem to know what to do with their lives; i hope i’m a role 
model for them. certainly in the early part of my education i had no particular 
interest in these more specific things i ended up doing later, including becoming 
a lawyer. none of that was part of my landscape of interests growing up. Like 
a lot of people of my generation i found myself in law school pretty well by 
default as i didn’t seem to have any talent for anything that was really hard. Law 
school seemed relatively accessible, and the general sense in those days was 
with a law degree you could then go into journalism or politics, so i was never 
really driven even to the law as a profession. 
DS: It was the flexibility. 
La: Yes, it was another continuation of, in my view, a general education and 
subject matters that generally interested me, like literature, political science. but 
it’s pretty clear that i found my match for intellectual interests in law school. 
i liked law school right from the beginning, while a lot of people didn’t. My 
generation speaks very badly of their law school years, found it very boring. i 
liked everything about it. i liked the very mechanical stuff, like inheritance rules 
and so on. i find that intriguing. but obviously the fit for me was the combination 
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of (if you want to see it there) high moral content and an organizational structure 
to advance values. i liked everything about the law. i liked all public law issues. 
i liked constitutional law, but criminal law in particular.
there was sort of a defining moment, as is often the case. after my three 
years of law school in Quebec, in canada we do articling to qualify for the 
bar. During that year, the federal government enacted the War Measures act, 
essentially putting the country in a state of emergency, suspending all civil 
liberties in the face of what was called then – wrongly in retrospect – an 
apprehended insurrection at the hands of separatist terrorists in Quebec. this 
was an immense political awakening for me to see essentially the fragility 
of democratic institutions. this was a big liberal democracy, canada, with a 
long history of it, and all of a sudden overnight – i lived in Montreal – the 
army had taken over all the police stations. the streets of the city of Montreal 
all were under military occupation, so it seemed. it was very troublesome. 
From then on i developed a clear commitment to using the law to develop a 
web of protection for people, but also as the main tool for the prevention of 
the abuse of power. i became active in the canadian civil Liberties association. 
So that political moment for me in retrospect was pretty defining. 
DS: As a student and as a young law professor, would you say your 
focus was more on domestic civil liberties, protections, than it was 
international human rights per se?
La: Yes. i went to law school from 1967 to 1970, and this was probably the 
peak of the very aggressive discourse of nationalistic aspirations by French 
canadians. in fact, it’s after that that i went for the first time to the rest of 
canada, to english canada, which culturally was very foreign. When that 
happened a few years later i was just amazed at the political issues that 
people were discussing in english canada, like the Vietnam War, poverty, 
gender equality. During my years in law school in Quebec, the oxygen was 
entirely taken by the question of Quebec nationalism. it was not the sole 
issue – we had debates about abortion, and of course we were conscious 
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and we had positions and views on the Vietnam War – but in proportion, the 
question of the proper place of French-speaking canadians and Quebecois 
exercising their right to self-determination vastly dominated all other issues. 
We were consumed by that, which then became very interesting for me when 
i worked as the prosecutor, particularly in the former Yugoslavia where 
nationalism had been a pathology. Where i came from, nationalism was for the 
most part a very romantic, positive aspiration – there was nothing wrong with 
it. it was a very legitimate, very romantic set of aspirations that were advanced 
in Quebec mostly by poets and filmmakers and writers and intellectuals – 
and by a lot of ordinary people who wanted space to live their lives within 
their own culture. So it was very shocking to me to see the underbelly of 
nationalism and to see it having essentially turned into not the ideology of 
inclusion, but the ideology of exclusion – to the point of genocide. 
DS: I think within the larger human rights community it’s not unusual 
to find people who were drawn to it by their experience as a racial or 
religious or cultural minority in the countries in which they’ve grown 
up. To what extent did your experience growing up as a French Canadian 
help draw you into human rights at a later point, or at least spark your 
interest in civil liberties and the boundaries of state power? 
La: Depending on your perspective, you’re often a minority and a majority. 
French-speaking Quebecois are a minority inside canada, but a very large 
majority inside Quebec. So, if you’re intellectually honest, you have to be 
very conscious of that, of how assertive you need to be as a member of the 
minority vis a vis carving a space – cultural, economic, political space for 
yourself – amongst the majority, but also how you can very easily in doing so 
become the oppressor of minorities – for instance, in Quebec, of aboriginal 
peoples, or if you’re not looking just in terms of cultural minorities, of poor 
people, people with disabilities, other sub-groups of your own community 
who are in a minority position. So, maybe it does provide, if you’re willing to 
address these issues, an insight into the advancement of rights. 
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DS: Over the course of your career you’ve played an extraordinary 
number of roles and also a diversity of roles, going from law 
professor to judge, human rights investigator, chief prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Rwanda (ICTR), high commissioner for human rights. It’s many 
people’s experience that if you spend a long enough time in a certain 
career, there’s a certain professional sensibility and worldview that’s 
shaped. At some level, do you still see yourself as a professor or judge? 
Do you identify with any of those roles? Do you see these in some 
ways as roles that you’ve played on the stage or costumes that you’ve 
had to wear, and your identity lies in some other place behind that? 
La: Well, as a matter of fact, in at least one of these roles i had to wear a 
costume – on the bench – so the metaphor is not at all inappropriate. i have 
to say that when this is all over (and it’s not all over; i hope i still find myself 
gainfully employed if i could just make up my mind about what to do with 
my future), i think of myself as a jurist. i suppose i could say a lawyer, but 
i am a person of the law. i won’t think of myself perennially as a judge, 
though i’ve done that for a large part of my career. i was also an academic 
for a considerable part of it. then i was an international civil servant in my 
two international roles, but they were very different – that of prosecutor and 
that of high commissioner. 
but the one common thread through all of this is i come to all these positions 
very much as a person of the law, as a jurist. i believe in the law. it’s the 
field in which i have expertise in which i’m very self-reliant; i trust my own 
judgment and analysis of the law. and the rest of it i think i was an accidental 
tourist on the more political scene, for instance internationally. and i’ve 
learned i think i’m probably better at it than i was when i first entered all 
that in understanding the complexities, say, of the united nations. but the 
common thread is absolutely, clearly for me the necessity to use the rule of 
law as an organizing principle of international and domestic affairs. 
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I am probably less an advocate than anything else because the one thing I’ve 
never really done is be a courtroom lawyer. I know a lot about techniques of 
advocacy, certainly courtroom advocacy, viewing it from the bench, and I’ve 
participated in lots of these things, but one thing I haven’t done myself is the 
kind of advocacy that now I’m freer to do than I’ve ever been really in my life. 
 
DS: I also wanted to talk about the relationship between career, gender 
and family issues. In the context of the current U.S. presidential election, 
questions have been raised in some quarters about the ability of Sarah Palin, 
the nominee for vice president on the Republican ticket, to serve as vice 
president of this country given that she has five children, including one child 
with special needs. Of course, many people have pointed out that the same 
question would never be asked of a male candidate, and I know you have 
three children, and grandchildren as well. In your career, have you had to 
face this double standard as well as other double standards along the way? 
La: i have made choices, professional choices, that always took into consideration 
all my circumstances including the fact that i have three children and i was their 
mother in this world. Whether cultural constraints and so on still impose gender 
roles that are different for men and women, if you look at it globally i think 
overwhelming it is true. and yet i have many friends who are women lawyers 
who’ve had husbands whose careers have given them more leeway to be at 
home. i think there is a growing change in the otherwise stereotypical model of 
the north american family unit. but it’s changing very slowly. 
My daughter is now in her career where i was when she was born, a 31-year-old 
lawyer, expecting a second child, and frankly, sometimes i think, God we’ve made 
no progress. She faces exactly the issues i was facing about childcare and what 
kind of arrangements can be put in place. We’ve progressed a little bit; i think the 
maternity-leave support and so on is more advanced and better developed. 
but essentially i would never lecture another woman about how to run her 
life and manage her family circumstances. i think it depends first of all on the 
partnership with her spouse, of the role she wants to play in the upbringing 
of her children. there were things i deliberately decided not to pursue, and 
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in part maybe that’s why i never went into private practice when my children 
were quite small. even though i always worked, my being available to them 
was very important to me when they were quite young. basically the jobs i’ve 
done a little later in my career i could not have done when my children were 
little – one, because i didn’t have the experience obviously, but also because 
my family circumstances would not have permitted it. 
DS: I want to shift gears and now talk about issues of international 
justice and international judicial policy, international tribunals and 
prosecutions. From 1996 to 1999 you served as chief prosecutor for 
the ICTR and ICTY, and as you’ve said publicly before, these tribunals 
are part of the legacy of Nuremberg and in turn they’re going to leave 
their own legacy. Of course, no initiative is perfect – you might say 
little by little we’re conducting experiments in international justice, 
hoping that each one is better than what came before it. What are the 
lessons of the ICTY and ICTR? What do they represent in terms of 
achievements? But also, what would we change if we could go back, 
knowing what we know now? 
La: i think the biggest achievement of the two ad hoc tribunals, taken 
together, is that they were sufficiently successful to lead to the creation of 
the international criminal court (icc). it was not obvious when they started 
whether this would not be a one-shot affair, what would be the lesson learned. 
there are lots of shortcomings. i think if we had to do it again, i would like 
to think we would have found a formula that would be less costly, more 
efficient – but as they say, it’s like dogs dancing: Sometimes it’s a miracle 
they’re dancing at all, so you don’t watch the steps too closely. 
there is something absolutely miraculous about the fact that these tribunals 
have hit their stride and led to the creation of the international criminal court. 
When i say it’s miraculous, it’s because there were obviously strong political 
winds blowing constantly against the expansion of the idea of accountability. 
in a sense it was done very rapidly. there are lots of structural flaws. if you’re 
interested in criminal law for instance, it’s very clear to me in retrospect 
that we copied basically domestic models of criminal law enforcement and 
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transposed that to the international community, but the environment is 
completely different. and the icc has not fixed that. 
i think in the longer term we’ll have to move to a criminal law model that 
is very indigenous to working in the international forum, which means all 
the obvious – we don’t have our own police force – but it also means that 
in a lot of cases there is a state working against you. if you indict a head 
of state or a high-ranking military officer, it’s possible – not in every case, 
but it’s possible – that his government will have an interest in getting him 
acquitted and will work very systematically in that direction. the rules are 
premised on the fact that it’s the prosecutor who has all the state’s powers, 
so to restore the balance you have to put constraints on the prosecutor and 
give advantages to the accused, like the presumption of innocence and the 
right to be tried in a reasonable time and the right to counsel and all kinds 
of rights. You put constraints on the methods available to the prosecutor. in 
these environments very often the situation is completely reversed: the state 
is on the other side. So we still have conceptually some work to do. but the 
biggest success is that we got there. 
as one example, even though they might not have been completely dismantled, 
when i arrived in 1996 as prosecutor, there was a credible possibility that the 
tribunals would adopt trials in absentia because the judges in particular were 
so frustrated at the limited prospect of arrests of indicted war criminals. now, 
to me, this would have been a catastrophic setback because it would have 
become very addictive and the tribunals would have basically become courts 
of archives. if there was an alternative to arrest, the little political will there 
was to perform these arrests would have completely dissipated. So the fact 
that we actually managed to make these tribunals work as real courts where, 
hard as it was, all the parts eventually fell into place, from investigation to 
arrest to trial to conviction to incarceration, is nothing short of miraculous.  
DS: Some people have criticized the tribunals in particular by saying 
that they weren’t anchored in the communities which they were most 
intended to serve. What do you think of this criticism? To some extent, 
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one can ask the question whether it’s possible to do international justice 
or international tribunals in a way that avoids this, given that the 
international community only intervenes when the national systems 
have already failed, so there is some disconnect between tribunals and 
the victims to begin with. Do you think something like the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, a more hybrid model, has hit the mark, even 
though it obviously has its own shortcomings? 
La: certainly in the common law tradition, the fundamental concept of the 
jury system is that justice has to be local and as local as possible. a change 
of venue is already an extraordinary measure that can be employed only 
when a fair trial is otherwise at risk. So the idea that justice is very local and 
has to be owned by the injured community is very strong. i think we have to 
ask ourselves whether this is desirable in the international forum, and if it is 
desirable, then we should do everything we can to accommodate, recognizing 
that in some cases it will not be immediately possible. if we take rwanda, for 
instance, if we believe that this local aspect to international justice is critical, 
the question is, how soon could you hold a trial in kigali? 
i think first we have to ask ourselves fundamental questions: are we again just 
transposing a domestic model onto the international model? When a crime is 
“against humanity,” who is the injured community? Where is the appropriate 
venue for the trial? i think it’s worth thinking about because if it’s too local, it 
loses in part the deterrent effect, but most importantly, the denunciation effect 
of an international voice. if you take the Special court for Sierra Leone, you 
might say – it’ll be interesting to see if this can be measured – it would have 
greater impact domestically because it was closer to the ground so to speak, but 
maybe a lot less impact internationally in telling the Sierra Leone story to the 
world and, in that way, rallying the international community in its denunciation 
of what happened, serving as a deterrent model. i think it cuts both ways. 
Maybe this will all become irrelevant as we move into an era when geography 
is a lot less relevant with the kind of information technology we have. 
i think the key though as we refine these models is constantly to ask ourselves, 
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what is the guiding principle, what is the desirable objective? and then do 
everything we can to foster that objective, as opposed to conceding without 
much thought whether we could get much closer to the ground. With ictY, 
for instance, it might have been true at the beginning, maybe less true later 
in the process. 
DS: Do you think the ICC obviates the need for ICTRs and ICTYs? 
Are these the last ad hoc tribunals we’re going to see? Also, you 
mentioned the issue of cost. It’s often been said that war and human 
rights violations are much more costly than justice will ever be, but 
politically the issue of cost in the United Nations is very problematic. 
Will the combination of the ICC and the cost of the ICTR and ICTY 
mean that they will be the last of their kind? 
La: i think it’s very difficult to imagine that the Security council would set up 
another ad hoc tribunal, particularly now that it has created the precedent of 
sending a referral to the icc in the case of the Sudan. now that the Security 
council has used its referral power, it would be hard to imagine on what kind 
of rationale it would choose not to refer a case to the icc and call on all the 
expenditures for setting up a fully parallel process. 
it doesn’t mean that the Security council’s role in activating accountability is over 
– quite the opposite. i think that, in a sense surprisingly but happily, they did 
exercise that jurisdiction in the case of Sudan. but it seems to me that that sends 
a signal that this is the route to go in the future, and we’re unlikely to see totally 
self-standing international ad hoc initiatives like the first two. We’ll probably see 
a lot more hybrid-type models and probably see also a branching out, as we’re 
seeing in the case of Lebanon, outside the traditional war crimes tribunals. 
there’s a danger there i think. We have to think pretty seriously about 
whether the united nations wants to be in the supplemental criminal justice 
business, but unattached necessarily to war crimes or crimes against humanity 
in some cases where there may be a lot of political difficulties in just using 
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the national systems. after Lebanon, the same issue percolated in the case of 
the assassination of benazir bhutto, for instance. Here’s a sovereign country 
that has a lot of capacity for investigations and prosecutions, but where 
there could be political suspicions. So, will the united nations be drawn into 
criminal justice enforcement outside the war crimes models? i think the jury’s 
still out on these kinds of issues. 
as for cost, you are entirely correct. it will continue to be so that a year in the 
life of a tribunal or the icc is cheaper than a day of peacekeeping operations. 
at the end of the day, it’s not how much money it costs in the abstract or in 
comparison to war or in comparison to a day in the budget of Monuc in the 
Drc.1 the question is and will always remain: if that was all the international 
community was prepared to put into post-conflict reconstruction, was it 
money well-spent to put it all into the trial of 12 or 50 people, say in the 
case of rwanda? Who should have the right to answer that question? is it 
the victims, the people of rwanda? Would they have said, “Well, if you had 
told us you would be spending a billion dollars in this exercise, we would 
have said no thank you, just write the check and we’ll do something else 
with it”? but that’s not the way i think that one can realistically look at it. 
DS: When we talk about the future of tribunals, the future of the 
ICC, but more globally the future of international accountability 
mechanisms and international justice, one of the big questions out there 
– and it’s argued different ways by different sides – is the question of 
politicization. Concerns are typically raised on at least two levels, the 
first being that given limited resources and the amount of time it takes 
to prosecute someone, only the biggest fish are going to be prosecuted, 
which inevitably raises questions about individual selectivity. 
And the second issue: African governments often maintain that they 
are disproportionately targeted by international justice mechanisms. 
They say that when you look around the world, Africans are brought 
to book while abusers from the U.S., Russia and Israel are left to 
                                                              
1 united nations organization Mission in the Democratic republic of the congo.
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carry on. This is particularly raised in the context of the ICC where 
all the indictments and prosecutions thus far have been Africans. I’m 
wondering what you think of this issue generally. 
I’d also like to ask you, as a former prosecutor who did have to operate 
with limited resources, how did you go about choosing whom to 
indict? Was it solely a legal determination, or do political policy and 
pragmatic concerns inevitably slip into the mix? 
La: i think on this question of politicization of the role of the prosecutor and 
this whole package, first we have to understand what we mean by political 
considerations. if we mean, at one extreme, would the prosecutor seek the 
consent or the approval of a permanent member of the Security council before 
taking a certain initiative or would they attempt to intervene – then that kind 
of blatant, purely political interference is completely inappropriate. 
in a domestic context, the general assumption is that all crimes detected 
are prosecuted unless there’s a kind of de minimis rule – that they’re so 
minor they can be ignored or disposed of by some form of minor dispute 
resolution. universal prosecution is the norm. the minute you work in an 
environment internationally, that’s clearly not the case; nobody claims that 
every person implicated in the genocide in rwanda will be prosecuted 
before an international court. it invites the exercise of discretion, which is 
not the same thing as political consideration. it’s political in the juridical 
sense, based on the policies. 
it seems to me that what we need is a more explicit framework developed 
by the prosecutor to guide the exercise of his or her discretion, so that it 
would be transparently visible why certain things are done and not others, 
why certain countries and not others. i think what is problematic is that, 
assuming there is a guiding policy, it’s not disclosed and it’s not discernible, 
so it looks very capricious. Discretion is not the same thing as arbitrariness. 
it seems to me that in some cases, the pursuit of opportunity is not in and of 
itself reprehensible. everything else being equal, if you have an opportunity 
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to arrest someone who is a high-ranking suspect, and next to that you have 
a file where you conduct a two-year investigation but you don’t even know 
if the suspect is still alive, this could be a consideration. the likelihood of 
apprehension is one of the many factors you want to look for. 
the key is for prosecutors to circumscribe their own discretion by articulating 
the parameters within which they will exercise it, and the rest you do on a 
case-by-case basis. it’s the same for judges; that’s the framework. Lots of 
decisions made by judges are discretionary. it doesn’t mean they are capricious 
or unguided by experience or precedent or “political,” but it means you are 
not bound to do one or the other. and i think that it’s important when we 
embark on that discussion to be very clear about that. 
DS: But supposing for example that one were to look at the African 
cases before the ICC and one determined that in each individual 
instance they were made on the basis of the best principle, the most 
neutral insight available, even so, to what extent do you think that if 
this pattern were to continue of targeting almost exclusively African 
cases, the ICC is risking some of its long-term credibility as a young 
international institution? 
La: then it would assume that there is something wrong with this so-called 
targeting of principally or exclusively african countries. this begs several 
questions. the first one is, have they ratified the icc, the rome Statute, as 
opposed to others? it’d be very nice to go somewhere else, but if they haven’t 
ratified and the case is not raised to the Security council for a referral, having 
no jurisdiction is a really good reason not to be somewhere. i think before 
being too quick to say, well, these are all african cases, you have to look at 
who has ratified the treaty, where is the jurisdiction to start with. 
the second thing is, the prosecutor has to look very early on at the question 
of complementarity and admissibility of cases. again, i think it’s not an 
exaggeration to say that if there were hypothetically credible reasons to 
believe that war crimes may have been committed in different countries, 
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you may want to ask yourself, what is the likelihood that a credible national 
investigation will be conducted? and again, it’s not surprising – when they 
enacted the rome Statute it should have been perfectly apparent that the 
icc would essentially be a default jurisdiction for countries that did not have 
adequate legal systems and law enforcement and judicial systems in place to 
conduct in a credible manner complex and high-stake prosecutions. 
So, for a part of our history, if we continue to invest in other areas but not 
in this one – and i hope we will invest much more than we are now in the 
development of law enforcement and judicial capacity in african countries 
– there’s no question the icc will be the default jurisdiction. and this will 
be correct in law, even though it may be denounced for political reasons as 
incorrect. So, again, i think we have to look pretty carefully at the reality. 
but it is the case that the bulk of the icc’s work, if not the totality of its 
work, comes from africa. again, you can have two reactions. You can try to 
change the appearances by running around trying to find cases elsewhere 
for the sake of addressing this alleged shortcoming – which in my view is a 
political decision, and i’m not sure the right one. or you can acknowledge 
that reality and engage with africa, be very explicit about the fact that that 
appears to be the case. to my mind the question would be, shouldn’t the icc 
then maybe talk to the african union about having an african presence much 
more systematized, maybe holding some of the trials on the continent and 
so on? Sometimes you can transform liability into something more positive, 
rather than concede that it’s a liability and try to fight it. 
DS: When you were chief prosecutor, many of your efforts were 
directed at looking how high up the chain of command responsibility 
could legally be attributed. In the wake of rights abuses that have been 
committed by U.S. soldiers in the context of the U.S. war on terror 
and in Iraq and elsewhere, it seems that responsibility, at least legal 
responsibility, has often stopped at a relatively low level. Often when 
we talk about impunity for human rights abuses, we associate this 
word with poor and war-torn countries, but of course some argue that 
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that term does have applicability in the context of the U.S. war on 
terror, particularly as it relates to torture, extraordinary rendition 
and other abuses that have been committed. How do you assess the 
human rights legacy of the U.S. war on terror several years on and 
what it’s done to the ability of the U.S. to act as a good-faith promoter 
of human rights around the world? 
La: that’s a very difficult issue. We always put “war on terror” in quotation 
marks, as though intuitively the many who are forced to use that expression 
want to question all the baggage that is contained in that because it seems 
to call for the application of the laws of war. and when they’re not very 
convenient, then the war on terror is seen as a metaphor, so it’s really the war 
in iraq and the war in afghanistan. but secret detention centers, assuming 
some existed in some european countries, would be part of the “war on terror” 
but not a real war. So, i think there’s a tremendous obscurantisme around 
the use of that expression, not unlike the “war on drugs” as a worldwide net 
that covers everything from very targeted operational activities to ideological 
positions, for instance about syringe exchanges and needle exchanges and so 
on. i think the war on terror carries a lot of that ambiguity when it comes to 
the application of the law and which laws and to whom and by whom. 
now, again, to the extent that the united States has not ratified the rome treaty, 
its eventual exposure if it were a party to the rome treaty would depend on 
the quality or an assessment of its genuine ability and willingness to conduct 
its own investigations. there again, it seems to me it would be in the interests 
of the u.S. to be very forthcoming about exercising to the fullest its national 
capacity – which is the best bar against any external scrutiny – through the 
principles of double jeopardy, but even within their own statutes. 
it’s sometimes difficult to understand why there’s continued resistance to 
much more public, much more transparent investigations and accounting for 
apparent misbehaving, either in the use of torture or, as is currently the case 
in afghanistan, with the very surprising and continued high number of civilian 
casualties, which then lead to investigations that are never made public and 
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never seem to find anything, not even the smallest amount of negligence, and 
yet with undertakings that it won’t happen again – which is not very credible 
when you cannot explain what happened in the first place. 
DS: Very soon in this country we’re going to have a new president and 
a new administration. What are two or three things for the incoming 
administration to do not only to rectify some of the problems and the 
excesses of the war on terror, but also to regain some of that moral 
standing that at points in our history we’ve enjoyed?
La: i think the growth of what has been called american exceptionalism is 
a very serious liability for the kind of human rights and political advocacy 
that the u.S. wants to do elsewhere. it’s an untenable position to say you 
should be doing a, b, c or D, but we are not going to hold ourselves 
to these standards or at least we refuse to be scrutinized for that; tyrants 
should be brought to account, but we don’t have any tyrants and if we do, 
we’ll do it ourselves, so we don’t ratify or don’t join in any international 
consensus; we’re great champions of human rights but we don’t ratify any 
international instruments – but you should, it’ll be good for you. these are 
constantly called double standards and they become a serious liability for the 
advancement, the championing of human rights by the u.S. in some cases 
they are clearly double standards, in a lot of cases they are not, but because 
they are credible in some cases, they taint just about every american initiative 
in these domains. 
i think the first thing the u.S. would want to do is bring itself into the fold: take 
a seat on the Human rights council, ratify international instruments, send a lot 
of signals that it’s now a player and that it’s engaged and advocating for the 
importance of the rule of law. For the rest of the world, the entire Guantánamo 
exercise, secret detentions and so on were a blatant effort by the executive to 
bypass judicial review, which is a hallmark of american democracy.
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the united States has three branches of governance and the efforts by one 
to completely marginalize the other – that is, the executive trying to bypass 
completely the oversight of the courts – sends by action a signal entirely 
contrary to the message that the u.S. is sending about the spread of democracy. 
So then, the real message is that you should have democracy reduced to 
pretty gross electoral machinery: You should elect people in elections that 
are sort of free and fair in the sense that there were not massive frauds at the 
ballot box, and then that’s enough – you have a working democracy. 
this is a vision of democracy that is not what americans believe in. Democracy 
requires a whole set of institutions of checks and balances, free media, civil 
society organizations, courts that work, a real balance between legislative 
and executive power. So again, the Guantánamo message, quite apart from 
the sheer brutality of state action, sends a signal that when we talk about the 
rule of law, we don’t really mean it – given the opportunity we will bypass 
even our sophisticated control mechanisms. So at every level i think these 
activities have been very costly for the advancement of human rights and 
democratic values. 
DS: In the course of these last seven years, the U.S. administration 
has had a lot of high-profile clashes in the Security Council and with 
the United Nations. You’ve just stepped down from your post as high 
commissioner, so I wanted to talk with you about the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the U.N. human rights 
system. What was the high point of your time as high commissioner, and 
what were two or three of your biggest frustrations or disappointments 
working within that system during your time there? 
La: the high point was probably what happened to us during the secretary-
general’s reform initiative, what eventually led to the outcome document of 
the World Summit in 2005 – this was kofi annan’s very ambitious reform 
agenda. He failed in his attempt at reforming the Security council, but as 
part of this exercise we were mandated to develop a plan of action for the 
28
office of the High commissioner for Human rights and through all these 
initiatives, we rapidly presented a plan of action that in my view had a very 
explicit vision. it was very frank about how we wanted to be involved in 
implementation of rights, not just further normative exercises. to be more 
specific, we requested as part of that a commitment by the General assembly 
for the doubling of our share of the regular budget of the united nations 
within five years. it was a monumental achievement that we managed to get 
that commitment in the outcome document of the reform exercise. 
it was also part of reforming the commission on Human rights into a Human 
rights council; there were lots of other things. but for oHcHr itself, basically 
it has meant that after my four years as high commissioner, i left the office with 
twice the size it was when i came in, twice as much money, we grew to twice 
as many staff members, and therefore had the capacity to work in the field. 
this was transforming. it was on an order of magnitude that went beyond just 
regular budgetary increases; it actually transformed an organization that was 
otherwise devoted almost exclusively to servicing member states, servicing 
the Human rights council, servicing the treaty body system, and all of a 
sudden through this influx, oHcHr was able – in addition to these tasks – 
to develop its own agenda of promoting and protecting human rights in the 
field. So, this was i think pretty fundamental. 
DS: And frustrations and disappointments? 
La: Some of them are very technical and they would not be of general 
public interest, but for me they were very real. one of them is my failure at 
attempting a parallel reform of the treaty body system. it’s very obscure, it’s 
a system that’s not very well-known, it may not mean much for a general 
audience. i think in retrospect the kind of appetite for reform in the united 
nations had dwindled. by the time they managed to get enough energy to 
abolish the commission on Human rights and create the council, to take 
on a major institutional reform of the treaty body system was just too much 
at that time. but i remain persuaded that as a monitoring body it’s archaic, 
it’s invisible, and as a result of that, it has very little authority, it’s not well-
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known, it’s not easily accessed, it’s owned in a sense by a very small circle 
of experts. i think it has the capacity to be a lot more than that. and i was 
completely unsuccessful. Member states i think were very wary that this 
eventually, over the horizon, was a plot on my part to create a court. 
on a day-to-day basis, what’s frustrating for the human rights high 
commissioner, probably more than for any other u.n. official – but for all u.n. 
officials to one degree or another – is that at the end of the day, you cannot 
make states do what they should do but don’t want to do. the barrier of state 
sovereignty in the human rights field is pretty catastrophic, but i’m sure the 
high commissioner for refugees feels the same way on a day-to-day basis. the 
under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs i’m sure is at times hugely 
frustrated at his inability to deploy. but in human rights, it’s endemic. 
DS: It seems like so many human rights blockages do just boil down to 
a question of political will, which is of course hard to generate as an 
international civil servant. 
La: Yes, that’s right. but that’s why, because at this stage there’s so much to 
do, you have to make a pretty cool-headed assessment of opportunities and 
temporarily lost causes, and deploy when there is a chance for action. of 
course you get heavily criticized for being here but not there, but at the end 
of the day you have to work with what’s available. and some things are just 
not available. 
DS: When we talk about the Human Rights Commission and the 
Human Rights Council, is there a distinction? Is there a difference 
and are there new possibilities for an effective institution that didn’t 
exist before? 
La: i think there is, structurally, good news, but no, we cannot underestimate 
the fact that the morning after the commission was abolished and the council 
was created, it was the same men and women occupying the same chairs in 
the same room. until you have a healthy rotation, both of states, members of 
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the council, office holders, the various ambassadors who are there – people 
come and go and it makes a huge difference – i think it will take time before 
the Human rights council develops its own footprint. Let’s put it this way: 
it’s more like the former commission than unlike. 
it does have a few features that carry at least the possibility of a pretty 
dramatic change. the universal periodic review, even if in and of itself it 
doesn’t do miracles in portraying the deficiencies of each individual state, is 
a fundamental transformation in the culture of individual state scrutiny – and 
that has been the albatross of the commission. the commission failed because 
it could not reinvent itself into a body that could try to be an implementer of 
norms. it was very good at articulating and developing norms, but the minute 
it started having country rapporteurs and fingering individual countries, it 
totally collapsed. the council has that capacity, in part through the universal 
periodic review, of getting states to come and sit at the table and put a 
spotlight on at least their grossest, most obvious human rights shortcomings 
in a public environment. this i think will payoff, that in the long run it will 
be business as usual to look at what countries do on the ground. but it will 
take time before that becomes part of the culture of the council. 
DS: One of the successes of the human rights movement over the last 
50 years is that all states now feel at least some obligation to defend 
their human rights records and speak in the vocabulary of human 
rights. At the same time, part and parcel with that, we see states 
becoming more adept at using the language and vocabulary of rights, 
seeing through the passage of legal instruments designed to ensure 
we strive for human rights, but we see there is very little change on 
the ground in terms of abuses that are taking place. What can the 
international community and NGOs do that’s not already being done 
to call people to account for this duplicity: states cloaking themselves 
in the language of human rights, the language of democracy, but of 
course the practice is often anything but? 
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La: i think the one thing that we have done smartly is create these kind 
of irreversible institutions that force states in the right direction – a lot of 
them yelling and screaming about all these mechanisms of personal criminal 
accountability. in a sense it’s a miracle that the tribunals were formed and 
then the icc was in place, but now that it’s in place, its tools can be used to 
advance human rights compliance in a small way in that environment. i think 
we have to continue, as the norms are well in place to develop the institutions. 
i think we need to advocate for human rights regional institutions, in asia for 
instance where it’s very absent, because after that’s in place – with a little bit 
of luck, led by people with a spine – it can actually start producing results. 
i think we have to face head-on the current climate of disrespect for the 
human rights discourse that comes from this perception of double standards, 
politicization, human rights being essentially the vehicle of the promotion 
of Western interests. that becomes very facile but very popular language in 
developing countries. it has a lot of resonance. it plays on national pride, 
suspicion of Western intentions. So i think this is absolutely critical. and 
that’s why i tell my friends in the european countries, until some of you start 
ratifying the convention on the rights of Migrant Workers, you can’t credibly 
lecture others about their shortcomings. can’t you see how not credible it is? 
and frankly, the Durban review conference i think is another albatross, another 
minefield that can be very easily manipulated to derail all the important 
human rights efforts by essentially hijacking the agenda and the rhetoric and 
re-characterizing things in a very negative way. i think on all these issues, 
when the Western countries express enormous skepticism about the Durban 
review process and the danger that it could be transformed into an anti-Semitic 
rally and so on – it’s true, it’s not an illegitimate concern, there’s historical 
precedent to express that concern – the danger is that to others it looks like a 
very convenient pretext for the Western world not to look at the one human 
rights issue in which they are profoundly deficient, which is racism and which 
matters a lot to the rest of the world. in a sense it fosters the cynicism that 
funny enough, when you talk about issues where their shortcomings are very 
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obvious – migration, racism – the Western world all of a sudden finds all kinds 
of good reasons not to be a player or not to be engaged. 
i think the burden is on the Western countries. it’s easy to say that they’ve already 
done enough, they are the good guys to start with – that’s not enough because 
they have more capacity. and if they’re serious about the promotion of the entire 
agenda, they’re going to have to do a lot of the tough things themselves. 
DS: You have also talked about the benefit that increased recognition 
by the Western powers of economic, social and cultural rights could 
have for the advancement of human rights in general. We often repeat 
homilies about the indivisibility and interdependence of all rights, but 
of course in practice there has been a marginalization of economic, 
social and cultural rights and a privileging of civil and political rights. 
You’ve also noted in the past that when you consider the links between 
security, human rights and development, drawing those distinctions 
between the two treaties just simply doesn’t make sense anymore. Do 
you think the emerging paradigm of human security is something 
that would allow us to move out of this legacy of categorization of 
rights into two large camps?
La: this is in part something that i will address in my talk tonight, not 
with a lot of answers, but at least highlighting again these difficulties. i 
think it’s no better expressed than in the field of gender equality. if you 
look at the position of women worldwide who are to varying degrees in 
positions of inequality virtually everywhere, even in very advanced liberal 
democracies in which their participation in public life is increasing they still 
have a disproportionate share of poverty and ill health and so on. if you 
look at that, it seems to me that the impact of economic and social rights on 
gender inequality is dramatically more severe than the impact of violations 
of civil and political rights. 
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i think it’s important to use maybe the timing of the 60th anniversary of the 
universal Declaration of Human rights (uDHr) to try to reintegrate these 
efforts again, for a lot of reasons. First, i think the advancement of economic 
and social rights in any country would be a good thing on their own merits, 
but furthermore, this will also go to addressing directly this question of 
double standards, hypocrisy and the pursuit of a purely culturally Western-
driven vision of human rights. 
it will also have the advantage of, if the West were to seriously engage in 
these issues, calling the bluff of the developing world. either they’re serious 
that they’re interested in social and economic rights or it’s just a pretext 
for doing nothing, so why not really engage there? but it’s very contrary to 
the Western economic market model. it may be that the rattling of the u.S. 
financial markets, the pretty severe tsunami that seems to be hitting them, 
will posit that proposition in terms that will be more accessible to discussions 
in the united States. 
DS: I want to talk about an issue that isn’t always thought of as a 
classical human rights problem in the traditional sense. It’s the 
question of corruption. Many manuscripts have been starting to try 
to make the case that, for example, rampant corruption can result in 
denial of rights to health and education on the social and economic 
rights front. Looking at civil and political rights, if we look at West 
Africa for example, we’ve seen that many of the issues that gave rise 
to the phenomenally brutal conflicts that took place in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone rest squarely in the area of governance, and here we’re 
talking about mismanagement and corruption. Do you see corruption 
as being within the mandate of OHCHR, that it’s sufficiently bound up 
with violations of both civil and political, and economic, social and 
cultural rights that we could start to address it as a traditional human 
rights issue? What can the U.N. system be doing that’s not already 
being done to address the question? 
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La: i have to say that the few times when it bubbled up during my tenure, i 
was not very keen to embrace it. i felt even by the time i left the office of the 
High commissioner, we could barely deal with the pretty classic human rights 
issues. in some we had almost walked away because of lack of resources 
and capacity. i thought we were very understaffed on the issue of migration, 
which is a huge battle within the united nations, because within the united 
nations the conventional wisdom is that migration is essentially an economic 
and political issue and not a human rights issue. i profoundly disagree with 
that vision, but the tackling of the migration debate in the united nations was 
always to be based on a win-win situation – that it’s good for the country of 
origin and it’s good for the other, and it’s all an economic model which then 
conveniently leaves behind those who are a burden to the system, people 
who are undocumented or uneducated or sick. 
i think to advance a strong human rights discourse on an issue as important 
as migration – which i think is one of the most important issues of our time 
in terms of the flow of population movements which will be exacerbated by 
climate change and scarcity of food and water – it is necessary for the high 
commissioner’s office to try to develop that expertise. 
there are other areas. the high commissioner for human rights is virtually 
absent in the u.n. system on issues of elections. they have become clinical, 
technical issues run by elections experts, but democratic rights, the right to 
vote, the right to representation – anchoring that in a sophisticated human 
rights promotion discourse is really important. the Millennium Development 
Goals – it was constantly a battle to inject a human rights framework to the 
pursuit of the alleviation of poverty, to make sure that from a human rights 
perspective you should always favor those at the bottom first. it’s not just 
raising an average, it’s making sure that the most vulnerable, the traditionally 
neglected are not the ones again further marginalized. all that is very hard. 
So getting into corruption as a deficiency of governments and so on for me 
would not have been a priority in human rights circles, just because i thought 
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our plate was so full with things that were much more mainstream and easily 
articulated human rights violations for which we were still quite deficient. 
DS: Is there any office within the U.N. system that is actually addressing 
it? For example, you raise the issue of the Millennium Development 
Goals, and in many of these countries, rampant corruption and misuse 
of funds from natural resources are in fact some of the reasons that 
the Millennium Development Goals are so difficult to attain. 
La: there is the office of drugs and crime, unoDc. 
DS: But they aren’t particularly looking at it as a human rights issue. 
La: are they looking at anything as a human rights issue? unDp [united 
nations Development programme] is a massive development program and 
has been for years interested in governance. now in the united nations the 
darling issue has moved from governance to rule of law. everybody’s in the 
rule of law business, even Dpko [Department of peacekeeping operations]. 
i tried to the best of my limited abilities, with virtually no success, to explain 
that the blueprint for rule of law is in the human rights instruments. it’s all 
there. that’s the kind of legal infrastructure for the promotion of the rule of 
law. it’s fundamentally a human rights issue. there’s a lot of money going for 
these projects, so there’s a lot of interest. 
DS: You mentioned earlier the 60th anniversary of the UDHR. In the 60 
years since that was adopted, the human rights movement has often 
found itself embroiled in a series of ongoing and persistent debates: 
peace versus justice; economic, social and cultural rights versus civil 
and political rights; development versus democracy. Given that most 
countries have signed on to many of the human rights treaties, with 
some famous exceptions such as the United States, what do you make 
of the fact that these debates continue decade after decade? Does the 
persistence of the debates call into question the universality itself, or 
is it just evidence of the persistence of politics? 
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La: Well, all i can say about universality of rights is, if you take currently the 
major international human rights instruments, they are pretty comprehensive. 
We’re not fully there, but the field is very nicely occupied with instruments 
that for the most part are very good. in all my travels, i have yet to meet one 
person on earth who if given the chance would voluntarily renounce any of 
these rights. When people talk to me about cultural specificity and “you don’t 
understand our culture or our religion,” i say, “Well, bring me someone in 
your country who doesn’t want to be free from government oppression, who 
doesn’t want freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equality.” 
i think the universal framework is correct. it probably needs some further 
refinements, some further applications, some doctrinal subtleties added to it, 
but essentially i’ve never been shown anything profoundly wrong with it. but 
there are shortcomings in implementation and there are tensions. the other 
issue now that is being manipulated to a point that is sickening is a fabricated 
conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Human 
rights is a body of laws and values that feeds itself in the political realm and 
vice versa. there’s no better political manipulation than to hijack a human 
rights issue and appropriate it. i think to a large extent the false debate 
alleging tensions between freedom of expression and freedom of religion is 
very much symptomatic of that, that human rights and politics kind of feed 
on each other. i think that is what’s always going to be with us. 
DS: You may be tired of people asking, but what’s next? 
La: i don’t know. i really don’t know. i will probably do something at some 
stage. See, i can’t even answer intelligently half of these questions. i need more 
time to think, get some distance. i’m very happy for at least a few more months 
of getting an opportunity to travel a bit, speak to students, visit faculties. 
DS: Do you have any parting advice for students who may be considering 
a career either in international policy and politics or international 
human rights? 
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La: it’s very difficult. in my case, things have happened to me so randomly 
that it’s difficult to say, do what i did – which is i just sat there and waited 
for the phone to ring and something else came up. there was nothing very 
deliberate in my own career. but i think in all the work i’ve done, it seems 
to me that you have constantly to maintain the right mix of values, passions, 
commitment on the one hand and skills on the other. there’s nothing more 
dangerous in my view than do-gooders who have very little skill but feel 
passionately about issues. at the same time, it’s a pretty short life to be 
only a technocrat, particularly in the legal business where there’s so much 
promise to do a lot of good with that. So i think particularly those who want 
to work on human rights issues and so on, i think you have to nurture your 
passionate commitment to it and, unfortunately i hate to say it, you have to 
do the hard work also that solicitors have to do on a day-to-day basis if you 
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year of looking at the importance of that. our first speaker is one of the great 
human rights and justice advocates of our time, literally of any time. 
Human security is much more than a right – it’s a basic requirement for 
human development. the institute for peace & justice is electric with the 
wisdom and passion both in this room and with what’s coming up to spark 
us onward, and we have the right person tonight to integrate security, 
development and human rights discussions for us. 
                                                              
 2 the Distinguished Lecture with Louise arbour was the opening address for the 2008 Women 




Louise arbour’s career is one of commitment and action on this front. Hers 
is a model for simultaneously humbling and inspiring all of us working in 
peacebuilding, and that includes everyone here – our students, our faculty, our 
staff and all the people who’ve joined us. teaching law, leading the canadian 
civil Liberties association, she then joined the High court of justice, the 
Supreme court of ontario, just 15 years after receiving a law degree. She moved 
on to the court of appeals for ontario in 1990. Many in this audience who are 
working for gender justice appreciate the challenge she took on in 1995, when 
as president of a commission of inquiry she headed an investigation on the 
prison for women in ontario, exposing the abuses there. 
a year later, she became the chief prosecutor of war crimes before the international 
criminal tribunal for rwanda and the international criminal tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. She was recommended by just the right person, none other 
than the first chief prosecutor, justice richard Goldstone, a member of our ipj 
international council, whom many of you know from his residency here.3
the Honorable Louise arbour again showed her mettle when in 1999 she 
indicted [Serbian] president Slobodan Miloševic´ – a strong, controversial move 
that proved to be exactly right, both as a statement about making people 
accountable and also pushing a peace process. a year later she returned to 
canada, newly appointed to the Supreme court. Following the tragic death of 
Sergio Vieira de Mello in 2003, she was appointed as the u.n. High commissioner 
for Human rights in 2004. She just finished her four-year term. 
once again she has shown the world tenacity and ethical courage and a 
commitment to human rights for all. this has not always made her popular. 
States and individuals have had their backs up over decisions and statements 
exposing those who wanted to be treated with less stringent, less balanced 
responses. they protested and grumbled and threatened. certainly when she 
stated that those in positions of command and control could be subject to 
personal criminal responsibility for their actions in the israeli-Lebanon conflict, 
                                                              
 3 justice richard Goldstone was eminent leader-in-residence at the institute in Fall 2005.
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there were some wide, worried eyes. the same was true when she criticized 
democracies along with regimes of tyrants. and while it happened far less, about 
one out of seven times, some countries we know and love were exposed. 
i think that regardless of our country of origin, we know that her assertion that 
nobody is safe when leaders who have the capacity to do massive damage 
to a population are guaranteed impunity is the reality we must confront 
when seeking human security and human rights for all. Louise arbour is a 
determined advocate for the adoption of international human rights standards 
and she speaks for many victims around the world. our distinguished lecturer 
is a beacon for peace with justice, to upholding human rights and having 




The Honorable Louise Arbour
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thank you very much indeed, ladies and gentlemen. i am truly delighted to 
be here and i’m very honored to be invited to deliver this very prestigious 
lecture. i should maybe at the outset put a few caveats. as has just been 
indicated, i finished my mandate as united nations High commissioner for 
Human rights at the end of june of this year, and i was delighted that for 
the first time in my professional life, i was regaining fully my freedom of 
expression, both as a judge and as a human rights advocate. i have fought 
all my life for the broadest possible scope of freedom of expression, but i’ve 
always been working in environments in which by the nature of my work, 
my own freedom of expression was somewhat curtailed. So as of the first of 
july, i was enchanted to have regained my freedom of expression. 
this lecture tonight is one of the very few public engagements i’ve undertaken 
since leaving my post. i have to confess to you that despite all this exhilaration, 
i can’t really think of anything outrageous to say. i thought i would be saying 
enormously outrageous things, but when i look at my prepared remarks they 
don’t seem particularly outrageous. 
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i should also tell you a little story that was told to me very early in my 
academic career and has led me to accept speaking engagements only when 
they’re followed by question-and-answer periods, just on the off chance that 
i’m a bit off topic. this anecdote will explain to you why i’ve been petrified 
most of my professional life about that prospect. 
one of my colleagues when i started teaching law was interested in human 
rights issues. this is way before the days of easy e-mail communication. He 
was contacted by telephone from a very far away country and was invited to 
come and speak at a conference. the conference was going to take place in 
a totally irresistible location, the Maldives or some exotic place, and he was 
very keen to go. the phone connection was not very good, and he said, “Yes, 
yes, i’ll come. So, what are you expecting of me?” 
and they said, “We’d like you to speak for 20 to 30 minutes on breastfeeding.” 
So he thought, well, human rights is a broad topic and the Maldives is a 
country i’m very keen to visit. i can do that. So he said, “Yes, all right.” 
He was a bit petrified and prepared himself extensively. When he arrived at 
the conference, he was told it was a panel and the panelists were introduced. 
then when it came to his turn, the presenter said, “now, professor So-and-So 
will address you on press freedom.” 
i have prepared a few remarks on the general topic of human security. i hope 
that i’m on the right page, but if not you’ll just have to bear with me and then 
in the question-and-answer period i may get back on topic. 
Let me also say that even though i’ve been here essentially just in the course 
of today, i already feel very much at home. i’ve been extremely well-received 
and i’ve had brief but intense opportunities to meet some of the women 
engaged in the Women peaceMakers program, some members of the faculty, 
and i feel very much at home. i hope this is a beginning of a relationship that 
we will be able to pursue in the future. 
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i also feel very much at home because you have invited in the past many of 
my old friends and colleagues – in fact, i was surprised when i looked at the 
list to see so many names of old friends and colleagues, including of course 
Mary robinson, jan egeland, Gareth evans, Lloyd axworthy, Shirin ebadi 
and, as Dee mentioned, i’m particularly pleased to follow once again in the 
footsteps of richard Goldstone. So let me now turn to my prepared remarks 
not on breastfeeding but on human security. 
in light of my very recent departure as u.n. High commissioner for Human 
rights, i seize opportunities like this one to try to distance myself from the 
day-to-day operations of that office and reflect in very broad terms about the 
effective pursuit of human security, particularly within the u.n. system. So let 
me try to clarify one thing at the outset because i find that there is often a lot 
of confusion that takes place when we talk about human rights and security.
          
“… it’s important to assert at the outset that security is a 
fundamental human right and that the obligation of states to offer 
basic security to people under their jurisdiction and control arises 
from their obligation to promote and protect the right to life and 
security of the person.” 
          
Fundamental rights and freedoms are very often described as opposed or 
contrary to the pursuit of security interests. For instance, in the law enforcement 
world you often hear that human rights impose constraints on the pursuit 
of security objectives. in the most outrageous form of that viewpoint it is 
argued, for instance, that the prohibition against the use of torture – which as 
you know is a fundamental human right that is enshrined in the convention 
against torture and is a norm of customary international law – stands in the 
way of the effective pursuit of security interests. 
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contrary to that position, i think it’s important to assert at the outset that 
security is a fundamental human right and that the obligation of states to offer 
basic security to people under their jurisdiction and control arises from their 
obligation to promote and protect the right to life and security of the person. 
So at least when we’re talking about human security, not state security, our 
conversation is very much about human rights.
          
“The human rights pillar … is made of glass: fragile, invisible most 
of the time, decorative at best, supporting nothing and therefore 
requiring only the occasional buffing to make sure that if seen it 
would look good.”  
          
Let me now turn to the way the united nations is equipped to support states’ 
obligations to enhance human security. in 2005, then Secretary-General kofi 
annan published his report entitled “in Larger Freedom,” which served as 
the blueprint for the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit. the 
expression “in larger freedom” comes of course from the u.n. charter and 
embraces a vision of human fulfillment predicated on the fundamental ideas 
of dignity and equality for all members of the human family. 
the secretary-general’s report also asserted, to my great delight as at that 
time high commissioner for human rights, that the u.n. architecture rested 
on three pillars – security, development and human rights – and that the 
three pillars were interlinked. in fact, his words have been quoted very 
often. He said, “there can be no security without development. there can 
be no development without security. and there can be neither security nor 
development without human rights.”
 
as time went by i became somewhat skeptical of this architectural metaphor 
of the three pillars. in fact, as presently constructed, if indeed the united 
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nations rests on three pillars, in my view they are of unequal structural 
strength. the security pillar is made of concrete: it’s rough, it’s strong, 
suitable for military-type operations. the development pillar is made of 
steel: durable, sustainable – to use development lingo. the human rights 
pillar in contrast, in my view, is made of glass: fragile, invisible most of 
the time, decorative at best, supporting nothing and therefore requiring 
only the occasional buffing to make sure that if seen it would look good. 
even though the united nations has a long history of engagement in security 
and development issues, clashes occur frequently among member states about 
the proper course of action in these two fields: security and development. 
these clashes at times paralyze action in the Security council or lead to 
inconsistent and inefficient fieldwork by a variety of poorly coordinated u.n. 
agencies who work broadly speaking on development issues. but nowhere 
more than in the field of human rights does the ambivalence of member 
states express itself. and this is so in my view for a variety of reasons.
          
“ … despite the assertion in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that all human rights are universal, interdependent and 
indivisible, in reality not all rights are championed with equal 
vigor, even by those states like the United States who purport to 
embrace a very strong human rights culture.” 
          
 
First and foremost, the comprehensive human rights agenda that is articulated 
in the universal Declaration of Human rights, the u.n. charter, leading 
human rights treaties and international customary law is a legal and political 
framework that imposes internal constraints on what a government can do to 
people, in particular to its own people. So not surprisingly, the enforcement 
of that framework by international actors, like a high commissioner, is 
quickly viewed as an infringement on state sovereignty and an interference 
47
in the internal affairs of a state. this is particularly so in countries that 
very conveniently confuse the interest of the state with the interest of its 
current government, which in turn can be easily confused with the interest 
of a particular political party or in the most extreme cases with the personal 
interests of an entrenched head of state. 
Secondly, despite the assertion in the universal Declaration of Human rights 
that all human rights are universal, interdependent and indivisible, in reality not 
all rights are championed with equal vigor, even by those states like the united 
States who purport to embrace a very strong human rights culture. economic, 
social and cultural rights – the right to health, to food, to education, to shelter – 
are not accepted as rights but as mere aspirations to be realized as a byproduct 
of a healthy market and decent democracy, in contrast to civil and political rights 
which are often promoted by Western countries in a manner that is denounced 
as imperialistic and self-serving by poor, developing countries.
          
“… the glass pillar of the U.N. architecture is very much in the 
process of trying to reassert itself as a truly indispensible feature 
of the legitimate quest for human security.” 
          
Finally, there are many more technical reasons flowing from the above. the 
nature and evolution of international law from first inter-state law to law 
that now reaches persons directly, like human rights law or international 
criminal law, has not fully matured. the growth of international and regional 
institutions with increasing enforcement capabilities and the globalization of 
a culture of rights, moved by an ever-more sophisticated nGo community 
operating at the international level – all these are still perceived as an affront 
to state sovereignty. in short, the glass pillar of the u.n. architecture is very 
much in the process of trying to reassert itself as a truly indispensible feature 
of the legitimate quest for human security. and it has much to offer, but 
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only if its champions are prepared to acknowledge the necessary linkages 
between security and development and embrace a human rights vision that 
is truly universal, encompassing all rights equally for all people. 
it’s interesting in this context to explore the promise and some of the 
shortcomings of the emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect, which i 
think is a topic that has been discussed in this institute in the past and is still 
very much at the forefront of a lot of international discussions on the issue 
of human security.4 as you know, the doctrine was born in the aftermath 
of the nato airstrikes in kosovo, initially as a product of the international 
commission on intervention and State Sovereignty, which introduced the 
concept in its 2001 report. Somewhat surprisingly, that doctrine was endorsed 
in very specific language – to which i will return – by the General assembly 
in the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005. 
                                                              
4 please see Lloyd axworthy’s lecture on “the responsibility to protect: prescription for a Global public 
Domain” and Gareth evans’ “preventing Mass atrocities: Making ‘never again’ a reality.” http://www.
sandiego.edu/peacestudies/ipj/programs/distinguished_lecture_series/
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as endorsed in that document, the doctrine views security in a very traditional 
framework, which i suggest links it, again, to civil and political rights. climate 
change, the food crisis, natural disasters, global epidemics such as those created 
by HiV/aiDS and anticipated by the avian flu – all these are posing security 
issues that emphasize in my opinion the importance and the relevance of 
economic, social and cultural rights and are not at this stage clearly conceptually 
embraced by this emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect. 
in a nutshell, that doctrine, as articulated in the outcome document in 2005, 
expresses the primary responsibility of states to protect their people “from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.” it then 
provides, of course, that if states are unable or unwilling to discharge that 
responsibility, the responsibility then passes to the international community 
which must intervene through a serial process involving prevention, reaction and 
rebuilding phases under the authority of the united nations and, in particular, 
of the Security council, if and when it has to come to coercive action. 
i will return to this sequencing feature in a moment, but first let me look briefly 
at the scope of the responsibility as stated in that document. in light of its 
historical linkage to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which posited 
an often unwelcomed right to intervene militarily to curtail a humanitarian 
catastrophe, the responsibility to protect was carefully articulated to stress 
not the right of the prospective intervener, but the responsibility of all states 
– primarily of course the state affected – to protect their people and to be 
supported in that effort and to be supplemented if they failed. 
i am concerned that too much emphasis is being placed on individual state 
responsibility, as if to mask the less popular aspect of the doctrine – its 
most controversial aspect – that of the collective responsibility of all member 
states of the united nations to take timely, appropriate action, not just to 
support a struggling state, but to overtake a defaulting one. reduced to 
the responsibility of states to protect their own people, the doctrine in my 
view doesn’t do much except to reconstruct the concept of state sovereignty 
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from a protective shield for state action to a bundle of responsibilities and 
obligations. but unaccompanied by any form of compulsory enforcement, let 
alone sanctions for default, this re-conceptualization doesn’t yield much hope 
for improving the plight of those supposedly entitled to state protection.
          
“… the most significant advance in terms of real prospect for real 
protection is in the transformation of the right to intervene into 
the responsibility to do so.”  
          
there is no hiding the fact that the bite of the doctrine is in the collective 
responsibility of the international community, acting through the united 
nations, to extend directly their own protective support to those who are 
abandoned, or worse are targeted, by their own government. and yet again, 
neither the outcome document of the World Summit nor, frankly, the thorough 
exposé of the doctrine by the original international commission that looked 
at it are very explicit about the nature of that responsibility. 
i must say that in my view the most significant advance in terms of real 
prospect for real protection is in the transformation of the right to intervene 
into the responsibility to do so. i think the language is very significant. i’ve 
made this point at length in a lecture i gave last year at trinity college in 
Dublin, but in short, here’s how the argument goes. the right to intervene in 
the internal affairs of another state in the face of a humanitarian crisis implies 
that the intervening state has a choice to intervene or not. that’s what having 
a right means. the exercise of a right is discretionary: one may choose to 
intervene or not. and in fact when the intervener chooses to act, it will often 
be perceived to coincide with its self-interest. and when it chooses to exercise 
its right not to intervene, it will merely be an exercise of a rightful option. and 
this of course would apply to the international community as a whole: it could 
choose or not to extend a protective hand to people in need. that’s under the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, the right to intervene. 
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“I believe that the responsibility to protect opens a truly new era in 
the pursuit of human security.”  
          
under the responsibility to protect doctrine, this is no longer so. there’s no 
longer a right, a discretion to intervene, but a responsibility, an obligation to 
do so, in certain defined circumstances. now this is a monumental conceptual 
shift, but it’s still lacking in clarity about the exact nature of that responsibility. 
is it merely a moral or a political responsibility? if so, it would still carry a 
considerable element of discretion in the sense that the consequences of 
failing to meet a mere moral obligation may not be very severe. but what if 
we’re talking about a legal obligation? and i believe that the responsibility to 
protect opens a truly new era in the pursuit of human security. 
there again i think a reality check is necessary. the legal obligation to 
prevent genocide is expressly articulated in the Genocide convention, 
which will be 60 years old a day before the anniversary of the universal 
Declaration of Human rights – that is, on December 9 of this year. it’s a norm 
of international customary law, but still very few efforts have been made 
since it was enacted 60 years ago to endorse it as such. 
this brings me to a second aspect of the doctrine of responsibility to protect 
as articulated in the 2005 World Summit that i think we need to examine. a 
debate emerged relatively early as to whether the responsibility to protect 
was couched in terms that were too narrow. as i mentioned to you, it’s 
restricted to protection from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing. Many argue that this was the proper approach if the 
doctrine was to have any real application. they claim that to the extent that 
it posits a role for the international community to intervene directly in the 
internal affairs of the state, the doctrine had to be focused on a restrictive 
set of the most egregious threats to life, thereby ensuring its viability and its 
relevance as a framework for international action. 
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others questioned whether this narrow focus was not once again a mere reflection 
of the Western-style preference for the protection of civil and political rights 
over economic and social rights. in many human rights circles, questions were 
raised about the responsibility of states to protect their people, their populations 
from disease, famine, the effects of natural disasters and of extreme poverty and 
deprivation, particularly if those deficiencies were rooted in discrimination. on 
what basis was state responsibility, national or international, to be restricted to 
what in effect amounted to international crimes, rather than reflect the broad 
range of human rights obligations either voluntarily undertaken by states by 
treaty or imposed on them by international customary law? 
          
“Security can therefore no longer be viewed as either threatened 
or ensured principally through the use of force. In that sense, the 
Security Council … should no longer be viewed as the sole forum 
through which the international community can extend its  
protective umbrella to persons in need.” 
          
the debate was not only theoretical, as i think was evidenced by the world’s 
reaction to the attitude of the government of Myanmar in the aftermath of 
cyclone nargis. French Foreign Minister bernard kouchner, who had been a 
very strong proponent of the previous doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
– in French, le droit d’ingérence, “the right to interfere” – invoked very early 
the responsibility to protect doctrine at the time of the cyclone in burma 
to suggest that the international community had to reach the victims of the 
cyclone directly, in the face of the inertia of the burmese government. in 
a classic case of making the theory fit the facts, some who had argued for 
giving a limited scope to the emerging doctrine were now arguing that the 
non-action of the government of Myanmar could be said to amount to a 
form of criminal negligence, thereby making it a crime against humanity that 
would then fit squarely within the emerging doctrine as currently articulated. 
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i don’t think it’s necessary, frankly, to solve here this doctrinal debate. if 
anything it illustrates again the inter-linkages of development, human rights 
and security, between freedom from fear and freedom from want. Many of 
the conflicts that have flared, in particular in africa, in the past decade are 
rooted in a multitude of human rights deficits and generate the widest variety 
of human rights violations. it ranges from arbitrary arrest to forced evictions 
to the particular vulnerability of women and marginalized groups everywhere. 
Security can therefore no longer be viewed as either threatened or ensured 
principally through the use of force. in that sense, the preeminence of the 
Security council, the primus inter pares of international institutions, should 
no longer be viewed as the sole forum through which the international 
community can extend its protective umbrella to persons in need. 
          
“… if we were to apply an intelligent institutional design to 
match the different phases of the doctrine – prevention, reaction, 
rebuilding – existing institutional candidates emerge and present  
shortcomings are readily exposed.” 
          
the 2005 outcome document envisages a crucial role for the united nations 
in the application of the responsibility to protect doctrine. in fact, if we were 
to apply an intelligent institutional design to match the different phases of the 
doctrine – prevention, reaction, rebuilding – existing institutional candidates 
emerge and present shortcomings are readily exposed. 
First, the Human rights council should be the preeminent forum for early 
warning and prevention. this new intergovernmental body was mandated by 
the General assembly in 2005, in the same World Summit, to promote universal 
respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 
the council in my view should therefore monitor and respond to both acute 
and chronic human rights situations through its regular and special sessions, 
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as well as through its new procedure of universal periodic review, under 
which the human rights record and performance of all countries, starting with 
the council’s own members, will be considered at regular intervals. 
now, this blueprint for action by the Human rights council has yet to translate 
itself fully into the current reality. as you know the Human rights council 
was created effectively in 2006, after the demise of its predecessor, the much-
maligned commission on Human rights. the Human rights council is still a 
political body and it behaves very much as such. it consists of 47 member states 
of the united nations, elected by the General assembly, and the 47 seats are 
allocated under the immutable principle of equitable geographic distribution, as 
a result of which 26 of the 47 seats are reserved for africa and asia.
          
“I would dare suggest that the membership of the United States in the 
Human Rights Council would go a long way to enhance the relevance 
of the council and could assist in moving it in the right direction.” 
          
although it was contemplated at the time of its creation that states would 
compete for a seat on the Human rights council and that they would have 
to make pledges and commitments as part of their campaign for election, 
and although it was hoped that members of the council would vote in their 
individual capacity – with their conscience so to speak – in reality the elections 
are rarely competitive within each regional group, and the members of the 
Human rights council tend to vote along group interests. Whether regional 
or geopolitical, these interests rarely coincide with the optimum human rights 
approach to the issue at hand. 
i think for the time being it’s safe to say that we have an institution that could 
serve an important prevention and early-warning role in the cases of serious 
threats to human security, but the institution that’s mandated to do so has yet to 
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live up to its full potential. and i would dare suggest that the membership of the 
united States in the Human rights council would go a long way to enhance the 
relevance of the council and could assist in moving it in the right direction. 
Let me turn to the second u.n. institution prominently featured in the 
responsibility to protect doctrine. the reaction component of the responsibility 
to protect norm fits very squarely within the range of diplomatic, dissuasive 
and coercive measures that the Security council is empowered to deploy, 
assuming that the situation has reached the point of constituting a threat to 
international peace and security. 
once again there are serious impediments to the Security council discharging 
effectively that function, one of which is of course the existence of the veto 
power of the five permanent members of the Security council. You may 
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remember that a major part of the secretary-general’s reform initiative, which 
led to this 2005 World Summit document, was the reform of the Security 
council. that part of the secretary-general’s effort was unsuccessful, but it 
generated useful ideas about ways to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of the Security council in the area of human security. 
Some of these ideas have been re-articulated very well in a recent article in 
Foreign Affairs, the September/october issue, by Morton abramowitz and 
thomas pickering. Without going back to the thorny issue of the membership 
or composition of the Security council and the issue of whether or not an 
increase in permanent membership should or should not be accompanied 
by a veto right, changes could be made without having to amend the u.n. 
charter, simply by developing a consensus among the current permanent 
five members about the appropriate use of their veto power. and in the 
same way, the authors argue that even a relatively modest contribution 
by the permanent five members of the Security council to peacekeeping 
operations, which they currently do not do, would go a long way to enhance 
the credibility and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, particularly in 
cases of emergency.     
all these discussions, which i think should be encouraged as political solutions, 
are more within our reach than formal institutional reform. Here again, 
however, a change of culture consistent with our collective responsibility to 
respond to humanitarian crises is not on the immediate horizon. 
now, third, there’s a dual set of institutions in the united nations equipped 
to handle the responsibility for different aspects of the rebuilding phase 
of the responsibility to protect doctrine. You’ll recall it has a prevention, 
reaction and rebuilding phase. the peacebuilding commission, another new 
institution that the u.n. reform process in 2005 created, has the mandate to 
facilitate post-conflict recovery, and it should be ideally suited to identify 
the institutional reconstruction and economic development aspects of the 
responsibility to protect norm in the longer term.
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“… let me stress that the sequencing of action from prevention to 
reaction to rebuilding is much more an intellectual construct than a 
likely scenario in reality. The reality of conflict management doesn’t 
always lend itself to a convenient, chronological unfolding of responses.” 
          
Multilateral justice mechanisms are also available to the international 
community to address the punishment component of reconstruction. as the 
international commission had noted, a major new element in the international 
community’s protection armory is international criminal justice, which has 
been and can be activated when domestic systems fail or collapse, through 
which perpetrators can be both deterred or/and held to account. 
Having said all that, let me stress that the sequencing of action from 
prevention to reaction to rebuilding is much more an intellectual construct 
than a likely scenario in reality. the reality of conflict management doesn’t 
always lend itself to a convenient, chronological unfolding of responses. For 
instance, advocates of responsibility to protect often stress correctly that the 
doctrine is not only, not even mostly, about military intervention. Much of it 
they say is about prevention. Well, this is a very confused response. Military 
intervention is a tool expected to be used very much as a last resort, but in 
my view, it could be an appropriate tool even in the prevention phase of 
the doctrine. For instance, in the face of an impending genocide or crimes 
against humanity of some magnitude, everything else failing or being unlikely 
to succeed, prevention could require military action. 
and in the so-called reaction phase – that is, when the crimes the doctrine 
seeks to prevent are actually being committed – the necessity to punish cannot 
be pushed back to the reconstruction phase. the call for accountability and 
the hope of personal criminal responsibility serving some specific deterrence 
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function – all this calls for the earliest possible investigation and prosecution 
of war criminals. this of course triggers the unresolved debate about the 
alleged conflicting purposes of peace and justice initiatives, and many will 
argue that punishment should be deferred always to the reconstruction phase 
of the doctrine and should not interfere with the protective reaction efforts.
          
“Whether it will make a much needed contribution to increasing 
human security, and therefore to peace and equitable progress, 
depends much more on U.N. member states’ political will than  
on any further theoretical refinements of the doctrine.” 
          
i disagree, as i believe justice serves a protection function, and that in the 
sequencing of response to conflict, justice delayed is still justice denied. 
again, it’s unnecessary to resolve this debate here, but it’s important to 
understand the breadth of this emerging doctrine and to think it through as 
we now seek to operationalize it. 
the responsibility to protect norm is part and parcel of a new vision of human 
security that the World Summit leaders agreed to in 2005. Whether it will make a 
much needed contribution to increasing human security, and therefore to peace 
and equitable progress, depends much more on u.n. member states’ political 
will than on any further theoretical refinements of the doctrine. but it depends 
also on building within the united nations an institutional infrastructure capable 
of effectively implementing the doctrine’s prescriptions. and for that, the full 
participation of the united States will be critical not only within the Security 
council, where it occupies with four others a privileged position, but also within 
the Human rights council, where by choice it occupies currently no seat. and 
for the u.S. to make the contribution that it can, should and must make to a 
more secure and a more just world, it will have to re-embrace the fundamental 
tenets of the universal Declaration of Human rights.
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“… why is the World Food Programme buying food from the 
Sudanese government to distribute it to the people of the Sudan? 
Doesn’t the government of the Sudan have a direct responsibility 
to feed its own people, the international community intervening 
only if and when it is unable or unwilling to do so?” 
          
on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the universal Declaration, the fundamental 
concepts of universality and indivisibility of rights may be coming closer in a 
world in which security issues are no longer to be associated principally with 
the cold War or the threat of nuclear warfare. the combination of catastrophic 
natural disasters, such as Hurricane katrina or cyclone nargis, and the 
negligence, ineptitude or worse of governments, has highlighted the dramatic 
impact of poverty, discrimination and social exclusion within countries and 
between countries. the profound insecurity created by deprivation is at 
the heart of the unfulfilled promise of globalization. even in sophisticated 
democratic societies, political play alone is unlikely to offer adequate 
redress. the law, and human rights law in particular, offers the blueprint for 
an integrated view of human security, guaranteed by individual rights and 
collective responsibility, and state as well as individual accountability. 
the current shortcomings in the distribution of responsibility between 
national states and the international community in my view can be no better 
illustrated than was done by jeffrey Gettleman in the august 10 edition of 
the New York Times in an article entitled, “Darfur Withers as Sudan Sells a 
Food bonanza.” the journalist exposes the booming Sudanese food-export 
industry, while the country is the recipient of billions of pounds of free 
food from international donors and while the World Food programme, which 
often gets donations in cash, cannot meet all its requirements for the Sudan 
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by buying food in the country because the government makes more money 
exporting it than selling it for domestic consumption.
this, one might say, begs the question, why is the World Food programme 
buying food from the Sudanese government to distribute it to the people of 
the Sudan? Doesn’t the government of the Sudan have a direct responsibility 
to feed its own people, the international community intervening only if and 
when it is unable or unwilling to do so? and why are governments like that of 
the Sudan willing to let the international community discharge its obligation 
to protect by feeding the people of Darfur, but it’s not willing to let the 
international community discharge its broader responsibility to protect the 
people of Darfur from rape, killings and displacement? 
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the answer might lie in part in the pernicious dichotomy between civil 
and political rights and economic and social rights reflected in the World 
Summit’s articulation of the doctrine of responsibility to protect. it rests also 
on the age-old difficulty of equating in law crimes of omission and crimes of 
commission. We may therefore need to articulate with better clarity the basis 
on which violations of economic, social and cultural rights may constitute 
crimes against humanity. just as it took very serious jurisprudential efforts to 
ensure that rape is properly prosecuted as a crime against humanity and even 
in appropriate circumstances as an act of genocide, gross violations of the 
right to food, to health, to shelter – whether by direct action or by criminal 
negligence – should come to find their proper place within the emerging 
doctrine of responsibility to protect. 
i would hope that every effort would be made both by international and 
domestic prosecutors to fully explore the scope of the law defining crimes 
against humanity, so as to give the fullest possible effect of the right to life, 
which is the cornerstone of both major international human rights covenants: 
the covenant on civil and political rights and the covenant on economic, Social 
and cultural rights. now, i suggest that this will require a holistic approach 
to security, first and foremost emphasizing human security over a nebulous 
and convenient claim of national security, and a genuine commitment to the 
imperatives of equality and universal entitlement to the protection of the law. 
in democratic society, what we ask of our elected governments is that they 
design and adjust at all times laws that will ensure the proper balance between 
our desire to be safe and our desire to be free. as people and as communities, 
we essentially ask ourselves, how much of my freedom am i prepared to 
sacrifice to my security? in a perversion of that question, often fueled by 
unarticulated political interests, some people who don’t think of themselves 
as vulnerable to abuses of power often hear the wrong question. they hear: 
How much of the freedom of others am i prepared to sacrifice to enhance my 
own security? the answer then is a lot easier, but the result is perverse. 
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“The rights of every individual are enhanced, not reduced, by the 
enhancement of the rights of others, and conversely, every one of 
our fundamental rights and freedoms is diminished by the  
curtailment of the rights of others.” 
          
this is where enforceable laws must supplement and support democratic 
ideals, and this is indeed the genius – in my view – of human rights law. the 
rights of every individual are enhanced, not reduced, by the enhancement of 
the rights of others, and conversely, every one of our fundamental rights and 
freedoms is diminished by the curtailment of the rights of others. ultimately 
both our freedom and our security are best ensured by the enhancement of 
the freedom and security of everyone else. in that sense, the imperatives of 
indivisibility and universality of rights have real, practical implications, the 
most important one being that rights must be enforceable and that they must 
be promoted and enforced by law. 
as i’ve indicated earlier, whether historically alleged humanitarian interventions 
were clearly such or whether they were a mere disguise for the pursuit of 
cruder forms of self-interest, they remain a deficient tool for the enforcement 
of human rights. even in dramatic and large-scale threats to the right to life, 
humanitarian interventions as we knew them before the articulation of the 
doctrine of responsibility to protect put inadequate emphasis on life as an 
enforceable right. in the wake of the opinion of the international court of 
justice in the case of bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, i 
think we are witnessing the important fleshing out of the legal obligation to 
prevent genocide, while we build on the political commitment to expand that 
responsibility to related international crimes.
63
Ladies and gentlemen, in conclusion and before i take your questions to get 
on topic, i suggest then that a legal landscape is emerging on which peace and 
security will be enhanced by the ascendance of an international legal order 
that will not supersede the political, but that will further constrain political 
action that imperils human security. From the articulation of the doctrine 
to the advocacy necessary for a broad-based political endorsement and the 
setting up of institutional and operational support, there is a considerable 
distance to go, but frankly, the biggest steps have already been taken. they 
were taken at least 60 years ago by the framers of the united nations and by 
the framers of the universal Declaration of Human rights. our task is merely 
to give it an air of reality. thank you very much.
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QuEsTIOns AnD AnsWErs
The audience submitted questions which were read by Dee Aker.
DA: Thank you so much. Given your travels, given your experience 
during those four years as human rights commissioner, are you 
optimistic or discouraged at this point? Do you find any place where you 
see responsibility being assumed in a way that would model a sense of 
possibility for us to proceed? 
La: For what it’s worth, and if it’s of any encouragement to anybody, i am 
actually optimistic, but maybe it’s just my nature and it’s not based on any 
empirical foundation as to why i should be so disposed. First, let me back off 
and say that i think that women have a particular take on these kinds of issues. 
i think that we are not easily discouraged by the concept that as humans we 
have to spend a lot of time just cleaning our immediate environment and that 
this is not a sign of defeat. it’s not because we don’t get up every morning to 
build the cathedral that we are in a state of regression. a large part of being 
human consists of cleaning our nest and making it comfortable for ourselves, 
for our families, for our clans, for our broader community. and that is a good 
thing; that is in large part just what is expected of us. 
So i think you become pessimistic when you set an unrealistic, very high bar 
for human accomplishment. to reduce conflict, which statistically we have – 
the number of raging conflicts has diminished – to address seriously the gross 
inequities that are a stain on our collective conscience, the gross inequities 
in the distribution of the wealth of the planet, within countries and between 
countries, is something we accomplish very much on a day-to-day basis. if 
we make a little progress on any of these issues, i think we have cause to 
believe that we’re moving in the right direction. 
DA: Let us hope. In the fact that there are democracies as well as these 
regimes of tyrants that are now holding up their responsibilities, which is 
more distressing to you: to see a democracy not upholding these standards 
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or to see that there are these regimes that are so off track? Which is the 
greater challenge to us? 
La: Well, again, it depends what it is we’re measuring. if it’s a sense of 
personal disappointment and almost betrayal, it’s true that we are hugely 
disappointed when we see an erosion, particularly an erosion in norms of 
behavior. Frankly, i think what has happened in recent years in the united 
States where the government was expressing ambivalence vis a vis the use of 
torture, or what amounted to torture, was causing enormous distress in the 
human rights community. they felt that if we can’t even maintain the terrain, 
the gains that have been made over the past 60 years on agreeing on norms, 
how can we possibly, seriously, believe that we will increase our capacity 
to enforce these norms? and how can the united States continue to occupy 
the strong leadership and advocacy role that it has occupied for such a long 
time if it is so easily discredited by those who are just looking for a pretext 
not to follow the path? 
but at the end of the day i find it very difficult to make comparisons: are 
human rights violations more severe in one country than another? the answer 
is probably yes, but i don’t think it particularly helps. For instance, i’ve never 
been a great champion of the idea of a kind of ranking of human rights 
performance. if we ask ourselves, are human rights more respected today in 
Mauritania or in Sweden, i don’t think it’s going to do any good to either the 
people of Sweden or Mauritania to answer the question. in my view, the only 
relevant question is to ask every state, very clearly, are you today in a state 
of regression, stagnation or progress vis a vis your own capacity and your 
own history and human rights record? that’s a relevant question, and that’s 
a question where i think on that kind of test, it’s quite surprising who would 
occupy the first place. 
DA: This question is regarding human security. In order to achieve 
some of the goals that you presented tonight, do we need a more legal 
approach – for example, a strengthening of international criminal 
law – or a more political approach – for example, conscience-building, 
consensus-building among political actors? 
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La: i like lawyers better than politicians. i firmly believe that there is no universal 
point-of-view. We all have a point-of-view. i come from the law. i believe in 
the law. i believe that we have not even begun to exploit fully what the law 
has to offer in international work. now, having said that, we can only hope 
and pray for the emergence of a more admirable political class. i don’t want to 
disparage any politicians anywhere, but i think the law offers us guarantees that 
are longer term than the political convenience of the moment. the law leads to 
the building of institutions – nothing happens without people, but nothing lasts 
without institutions, as the saying goes. if i only had so much energy, i think i 
would stay within the promotion of legal instruments. 
DA: In line with your newfound freedom of expression, do you believe 
that Myanmar, or Burma – in terms of its horrifying tragedy – was a 
missed opportunity to assert the requirements of intervention, when 
aid and aid workers were continually turned away with the charge 
that aid was for another reason? How did you perceive that? What was 
supposed to happen with that obligation as a basis of human rights? 
La: i think as the playing field currently exists, both the legal landscape and 
the emergence of a political consensus, i don’t think that any kind of forced 
foreign intervention was a realistic option, disappointing as it is to say it. 
Frankly, i think in that particular climate the best tools were still political 
ones, including trying to persuade china to exercise a more proactive role 
as an emerging and very important international power force in its own 
backyard. and in the case of Myanmar, on certain international initiatives 
china may have played a more positive role than it got credit for, possibly 
because it wasn’t really seeking any particular credit. but i think in the case 
of Myanmar, regional pressure (the aSean countries5 were very involved) 
and trying to mobilize the potential for the positive role of china was as 
much as we could expect at that time. 
DA: Do you have any comments, again with this newfound freedom, 
to make about the legitimacy regarding the humanitarian issue of 
                                                              
 5 association of Southeast asian nations.
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Guantánamo Bay, a prison containment center being on foreign soil, 
outside the U.S., and not under the same laws apparently as the U.S. in 
terms of human rights? 
La: the very first concern that i had about the existence of Guantánamo 
bay to a large extent has been addressed, and that was – both in retrospect 
and at the time – the clear intention of the u.S. government to avoid the 
judicial oversight that is part of its democratic machinery. there’s more to a 
democracy than electoral politics, and i think that we know that the strength 
of a great democracy like america is the linkages between the branches of 
government, between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branch. 
a great distress for me at the time, again coming at it very much from a legal 
point-of-view, was this blatant attempt to shelter completely the actions of 
the executive from the imperative of judicial oversight. 
Arbour discusses her lecture with IPJ WorldLink Interns Jay Bartell and Sierra Parker
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this has been addressed in large part through litigation. the courts have 
started to re-occupy the place the government was trying to deny them in the 
management of one of the most difficult legal, security-related issues of our 
time. in that sense, i feel a lot better that the courts are back in the picture 
very seriously. it doesn’t mean i’ve agreed with every decision rendered by 
the court, but that’s not the point. the point is to have judicial scrutiny. 
now, at the end of the day, i think that Guantánamo, the mere existence of 
that institution, has now become a metaphor for american exceptionalism, 
double standards, the lack of moral standing that the united States is perceived 
to have when it tries to continue its advocacy on human rights issues. So i 
think the existence of a facility in which there is, in my opinion, arbitrary, 
prolonged detention without much hope that any of these cases will be tried 
anywhere, never mind in this country, has caused tremendous damage to the 
united States internationally and domestically. 
DA: Staying on that political line, what message would you give to a new U.S. 
president regarding human rights and the damage that U.S. foreign policy 
has done in terms of representation in the international community? 
La: this is very presumptuous of me to start giving advice to an incoming 
president. there are many things. if i were asked to do a little prescription 
for what the u.S. could do, as i mentioned in my remarks, i think the united 
States has to rejoin the international community on the international scene. 
So i would hope that we will see the united States compete for election 
in the Human rights council. it’s inconceivable to have that metaphorical 
empty chair. i very much hope that we will see the united States – and that, 
frankly, is quite a modest expectation; i don’t think it’s a very big deal. i’m 
much more ambitious than that. 
i’d like the united States to re-sign the rome Statute creating the international 
criminal court. i really believe that american people coalesce around the idea 
that tyrants should be taken down, should be made to account, should be 
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disempowered. i really believe that that’s a standardly accepted view, but it’s not 
possible for the united States to promote that idea while at the same time making 
itself unanswerable to foreigners, to the idea that nobody can look at us. 
DA: How can private security actors be held accountable – under 
whose legal framework? 
La: i have a sense that this will be litigated and we’ll find legal answers to 
that. but it would seem to me that it has to be a fundamental principle that 
the state cannot abdicate its responsibility by delegating to non-state actors 
what is essentially its own responsibility. You cannot privatize warfare and 
say that the Geneva conventions do not apply because the actors are all 
non-state actors. i think that the courts will pierce this veil of delegation of 
responsibility between the public sector and the private sector in the general 
area of the laws of war, and that the responsibility will be revisited back 
where it belongs, which is on the state. 
DA: Seeing as this is part of a working conference on the role of 
women peacemakers, violence against women and security issues, 
what is your perspective on the gender dimension? Can you speak a 
bit more on the role women are playing? 
La: Well, maybe i’ll just take a little longer on this one, to back up one step. 
When i became a member of the judiciary in canada – well, first of all it was 
in the previous century so that’s a long time ago – but it was still at a time 
when there were serious questions about the numbers and the considerable 
absence of women in the courts. as we started invading the judicial system, 
there were lots of interesting discussions on the question, what difference 
should it make? if a judge is there to apply the law – you know the image of 
the blindfold – what difference should it make if you’re a woman or a man, a 
member of the minority group? You’re not supposed to decide a case on the 
basis of your personal preference, so why are you so exercised by the idea 
that we should have more women on the bench? 
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there were lots of debates and discussions and some studies about whether 
women judges speak in a different voice. and that debate was somewhat divisive 
to a certain extent, even amongst feminists and all those who were promoting 
more participation of women in judicial decision making. So there were many 
who certainly, based on the work of carol Gilligan who wrote the book In a 
Different Voice, argued that women have a different moral outlook, have a 
different sense of moral community. others were very skeptical and said, even 
if women through their upbringing had a different moral outlook, three years 
of law school will take away any moral outlook – it’s the great equalizer: You 
come out of this, you don’t have any moral views. no, i’m exaggerating. 
but the same debate, not as passionately articulated maybe, is simmering on 
the question of whether women really have something special to contribute 
to the rebuilding of communities, to post-conflict management. and frankly, 
without disclosing what position i took on the judicial issue, i really believe 
that women worldwide have a unique, very particular relationship to violence 
in all its forms. We are collectively the unfortunate recipient of the larger 
part of violence in all its forms, including the most invidious, home-based, 
family-related violence. So i think women have a particular understanding of 
violence in all its forms. 
i believe women have also a particular take on the resolution of disputes. 
again, there are lots of debates as to whether women are better at seeking 
a consensus. but at the end of the day it’s a matter of right. We have a right 
to participate in our own governments and we have to build institutions 
domestically and internationally that are the mirror of the communities 
in which we work. that’s what diversity is about, including i think the 
participation of adult women in their own governance, including in the 
reconstruction of a country and the search for peace. 
DA: When we think about the fact the U.S. is 69th in the percentage of women 
serving in government, and we look at a place like Rwanda, which went 
through this incredible crisis, which now has a majority of women running 
the government, what happens in that process? Do we have to go through 
some kind of violent experience to step to the plate to take action? 
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La: i certainly hope not. but frankly, the old-fashioned, liberal, Western 
democracies don’t look particularly good. i don’t have the statistics on 
the question of participation in governance, but there are lots of younger 
democracies – and maybe because they came in to structure it themselves in 
this century – that have no difficulty imposing quotas for the participation 
of women in their legislative branch. We have to be careful with that. in 
afghanistan, for instance, they have seats secured for women, but it’s very 
dangerous to have women basically being just the proxies of other interests. 
So it’s not a fully guaranteed system. but participation in governace is very 
much the contribution of the new world, of emerging democracies. on 
that front and many others, we, the more traditionally established Western 
countries, do have a few lessons to learn.  
DA: What is the United Nations doing to push the U.S. to ratify the 
women’s human rights treaty signed by most other countries: CEDAW, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women? Is there any pressure? 
La: it’s not just the convention on the elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. the united States is not a big ratifier of treaties, particularly of 
human rights treaties. that’s the reality. it has an extremely low ratification rate. the 
usual answer is, well, we don’t need to ratify because we’re already in compliance. 
i hear that one not just in the u.S. but in many countries that will not ratify. 
this is a debate that i think has to take place within this country. What is 
the united nations going to say to persuade the american government to 
embark on a series of treaty ratifications? Why isn’t the u.S. ratifying the new 
convention on the rights of persons with Disabilities? Why? i think this is a 
quintessential american debate. it has to take place in this country. it’s part 
of joining the international community. it’s part of rejecting any sense of 
exceptionalism that we’re different. 
in many ways, particularly when it comes to military action, i think it’s 
important to recognize that the united States has a very unique exposure. 
it’s called to action much more than anybody else. it’s very exposed. but it 
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doesn’t mean that it has to withdraw completely from the mechanisms that all 
others have to embrace, whether on racial discrimination, on discrimination 
against women, on persons with disabilities, the convention on the rights of 
the child. the united States has still not ratified the convention on the rights 
of the child. How can that be? along with what now, Somalia? 
DA: Assuming that Vice President Dick Cheney or former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld traveled abroad and are detained for crimes 
against humanity, would you take on the difficult task of defending 
them, if offered?
La: i thought the question was going to be, would you prosecute? but i have 
to say, defending has a certain attraction. First of all, it’s just about the only 
job i’ve never had in the realm of international criminal justice and compared 
to prosecuting it tends to pay better. but i don’t think it’s likely that my 
services would be retained in that capacity. 
DA: Can you say something about the rights of immigrants, the global 
phenomenon of people being pressed across borders, the internally 
and externally displaced? 
La: i think that the question of immigration is probably one of the most 
challenging for the entire world and, unfortunately, we tend to see it with 
very narrow geographic lenses. the word immigration on this continent, 
particularly in this country, evokes a particular flow of persons for particular 
reasons. but in indonesia, for instance, there is an exodus of domestic 
workers to the Gulf countries. So the question of the movement of people, 
particularly for economic reasons, is a worldwide phenomenon that in my 
view is not being addressed sufficiently in human rights terms. it’s being 
addressed, certainly in a u.n. forum, always as an economic and a political 
issue – but mostly as an economic issue, where the message is supposed to 
be that it’s a win-win situation: it’s good for the country of origin, remittances, 
it’s good for the countries who have shortages of workforce. but i think we 
haven’t really seriously addressed it as a human rights issue. 
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For instance, and this is not just the united States, there’s not a single Western 
country that has ratified the convention on the rights of Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families. now, how can the Western world lecture developing 
countries about their human rights obligations when it is not prepared to take 
on the responsibilities in the few areas that really hurt them, that are hard to 
sell to their populations, that are sometimes unpopular issues? 
on questions of migration, racism, all of a sudden you see a retrenchment 
by Western countries – by europe, by north america – and i think it has to 
be looked at in human rights terms, including the fact that undocumented, 
illegal immigrants have rights. they may not have the full-fledged rights that 
come with citizenship in the same way that landed immigrants or immigrants 
who are in a country irregularly may have, or the same full-fledged series of 
entitlements that come from nationality and citizenship, but they have some 
rights. they have the right to life. is anyone suggesting that we should kill 
them all? but this refusal to look at the position of people who are outside 
their country of nationality or origin as rights holders is not acceptable. 
DA: In Uganda the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) victimizes its subjects 
and yet the leaders of the rebellion fear to come to an agreement due 
to fear of the International Criminal Court and the potential for their 
arrest now. And so, the subjects on whom the Lord’s Resistance Army 
prey are still victimized. How can the Human Rights Council help or 
how can something change this case? 
La: on that i would question the premise of the question, which is that the 
leaders of the Lra refuse to negotiate a ceasefire or a longer term peace 
agreement because they’re afraid of the international criminal court. Where 
have they been in the last 20 years? they weren’t at the table, and there were 
no indictments against them. in fact, i think the icc withheld for some time 
its indictments in the hope that the peace process would advance. So, frankly, 
one has to ask, is this just a pretext for not making a deal that they don’t want 
to make in the first place or is this a genuine concern? and if it is a genuine 
concern, well, there are not a lot of options. the option that they would like 
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doesn’t exist anymore, which is not to be held accountable for anything. that 
one is no longer feasible. So if what they’re saying is that they would rather 
be tried for crimes against humanity in uganda, that is an option. it’s not one 
that’s up to them; it’s up to the icc. So there are options. but the one that they 
would like, which is never to have to account for their 20-year murderous 
rampage, fortunately that one is not an option anymore – thank God. 
DA: What can young people do to make human rights a fundamental 
pillar of the United Nations and the international community? 
La: there are times when i wonder how challenging this must all look, 
because young people today are confronted with so much more information 
and so many at least theoretical options, but how to materialize these options 
in reality is a little more difficult. i think we can’t be of every good fight. 
there are times when i look at what i’ve done and i think, i feel very 
badly because i’ve never been seriously engaged on issues related to the 
environment. Well, that’s true, but i was really busy. You can’t let yourself 
feel inadequate because you can’t save the planet in all its aspects. 
i think you have to pick your fights and really commit. then you have to 
show solidarity with the others who are picking the other good fights. You 
have to be a good citizen; there’s an obligation to inform yourself. but as to 
what kind of work plan you should have, i can’t say. i can’t even figure out 
how young people figure out what these options are for them. 
again, as a general position i’d say: pick one. Don’t feel badly you can’t do 
them all. Make sure that others do them all, particularly your elected leaders. 
believe in solidarity. You have to belong to a group that is moving with you 
toward this better world.
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through campus centers and institutes such as the joan b. kroc institute for 
peace & justice, the Values institute, the trans-border institute, the center for 
public interest Law, the institute for Law and philosophy and the international 
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infirmarian at alcalá de Henares, a monastery near Madrid, Spain. the Spanish 
renaissance architecture that characterizes the five-century old university 
of alcalá serves as the inspiration for the buildings on the university of 
San Diego campus. the architecture was intended by the founders, bishop 
charles Francis buddy and Mother rosalie Hill, to enhance the search for 
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and law students rigorous academic programs in more than 60 fields of study 
through six academic divisions, including the college of arts and Sciences and 
the schools of business administration, Leadership and education Sciences, 
Law, nursing and Health Science, and peace Studies.  
gIVE THE gIFT OF PEACE
Support the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
You can support the educational, research and peacemaking activities of the 
Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice by making a secure, tax-deductible, 
online donation at http://peace.sandiego.edu or mailing the donation form 
below with a check payable to: 
Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
university of san Diego
5998 Alcalá Park, san Diego, CA 92110-2492
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__ i would like to join the institute’s Leadership circle with a gift of $1,000 or more and   
 receive invitations to special receptions and events. 
__ My gift of $1,500 or more includes recognition in the uSD president’s club and the   
 institute’s Leadership circle.
__ i would like to support the institute’s programs with a gift of:
  __ $500 __ $250 __ $100 __ $50 other $______________________
 __ enclosed is a check for my gift 
 __ See credit card information below
please charge my credit card: __americanexpress __Discover __Mastercard __Visa





phone (Day) ( ____ ) _______________________ (eve) ( ____ ) _______________________ 
email ________________________________________________________________________ 
__ please add me to your mailing list for information about institute programs and upcoming events.
Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
Joan B. Kroc School of  Peace Studies
University of  San Diego
5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, CA 92110-2492
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